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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-Posthypnotic Testimony Is Admissible
in a State Criminal Trial. State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d
555, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983).
Hypnosis is recognized as a means of producing hyperm-
nesia, i a heightened state of vivid or complete memory. Be-
cause of this ability, the legal profession has used hypnosis
to aid witnesses in their recollection of past events. Al-
though courts consistently exclude statements made while a
witness is under hypnosis,2 the admissibility of statements
made by a witness after hypnosis3 varies from state to state.
In State v. Armstrong4 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a
case of first impression 5 endorsed the admission of post-
1. E. HILGARD, HYPNOTIC SUSCEPTIBILITY 165-67 (1965); W. KROGER,
CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 16 (2d ed. 1977); W. KROGER & W.
FEZLER, HYPNOSIS AND BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: IMAGERY CONDITIONING 21
(1976); Dywan & Bowers, The Use of Hypnosis to Enhance Recall, 222 ScI. 184, 184-
85 (1983); Kroger & Douce, Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL
& EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 358, 363-64 (1979); Orne, The Use andMisuse of Hypno-
sis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 312, 328 (1979);
Worthington, The Use in Court of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony, 27 INT'L J.
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 402, 403 (1979).
2. See, e.g., People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, _ 602 P.2d 738, 753-54, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 818, 833-34 (1979); State v. Conley, 6 Kan. App. 2d 280, _ 627 P.2d 1174,
1177-78 (1981); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860,., 46 N.W.2d 508, 521-22 (1950); State v.
Harris, 241 Or. 224, _, 405 P.2d 492, 497-98 (1965); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, -
207 S.E.2d 414,418 (1974); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, _ 204 S.E.2d
414,418-19 (1974). But see People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, _ 382 P.2d 33,39,31
Cal. Rptr. 225, 231 (1963) (hypnotic statements admitted as a basis for determining
the intent of the defendant); State v. Nims, 180 Conn. 589, _, 430 A.2d 1306, 1310-11
(1980) (tape recorded hypnotic session admitted to dispel any inference that the ex-
amination was tainted by improper suggestion); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, -
492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971) (tape recording of hypnotic statements played at the request
of the defendant).
Courts have also refused to permit a witness to be hypnotized on the stand. See,
e.g., Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
3. The terms "posthypnotic testimony," "hypnotically affected testimony" and
"hypnotically aided testimony" all refer to testimony given subsequent to hypnosis.
4. 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983).
5. A Wisconsin circuit court addressed the issue of hypnotically affected testi-
mony in 1979. The court recognized the potential value of hypnosis, but denied the
admission of the testimony because unnecessary and prejudicial suggestions plagued
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hypnotic testimony in a state criminal trial.6 Recognizing
the scientific uncertainties of hypnosis, the court adopted a
conservative case-by-case determination of the admission of
such testimony and set forth clear procedural safeguards to
protect against potential abuse in the future admissions of
posthypnotic testimony.7
This note will review the decision of the court and com-
pare the approach adopted in Armstrong with cases from
other jurisdictions. It will also analyze the impact of the case
on the legal community and discuss questions left unan-
swered by the court in its decision.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the prosecution of Ralph D. Armstrong for the first
degree murder and first degree sexual assault of Charise
Kamps on June 24, 1980, the state introduced into evidence
the incriminating testimony of Riccie Orebia. While sitting
on her porch, Orebia saw a man enter and exit Kamps'
apartment building. He did so three times in the course of
forty minutes.8 When the man finally left the apartment
building, Orebia noticed he was shirtless, running quickly
and perspiring.9
During the police investigation of the murder, Orebia de-
scribed the man as well developed, with big arms, a flat
stomach, and long dark hair.'0 Orebia gave her consent to
be hypnotized in an effort to refresh her memory of the
description of the man. Under hypnosis, Orebia described a
man of medium height with big arms, a small stomach, a fat
the hypnotic examination. State v. White, No. J-3665 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct.
Mar. 27, 1979).
6. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 560, 329 N.W.2d at 389.
7. See id.
8. Orebia testified that she first noticed the defendant at approximately 12:30 a.m.
on June 24, 1980. Dr. Robert Huntington, a pathologist testifying for the state, cor-
roborated Orebia's testimony by estimating the time of death to be between 12:00 a.m
and 3:30 a.m. on June 24, 1980. State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 562, 329
N.W.2d 386, 390 (1983).
9. Orebia described the man's skin as "shining" when she saw him exit the apart-
ment building for the final time. During his two previous exits, his skin did not ex-
hibit such an effect. Heavy perspiration may account for the "shining" appearance.
Id. at 562-63, 329 N.W.2d at 390.
10. Id. at 563, 329 N.W.2d at 390.
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nose, bushy dark eyebrows and dark wavy hair covering the
back of his neck.'1
After the hypnotic session, Orebia viewed a line-up and
promptly identified the defendant as the man she saw run-ning from the victim's apartment. In a pretrial motion, the
defense counsel moved to suppress Orebia's posthypnotic
identification of the defendant on the grounds that improper
suggestions of the defendant's height were made to Orebia
while under hypnosis. The trial court reviewed the hypnotic
examination and denied the motion, holding that no signifi-
cant suggestions were made to Orebia to influence her iden-
tification of the defendant.
The jury found the defendant guilty of murder and sex-
ual assault. On appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court,' 2
the defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting
Orebia's posthypnotic testimony and identification of the de-
fendant. 3  In State v. Armstrong14 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court authorized the use of hypnosis to refresh the memory
of a witness and held Orebia's hypnotic session had been sat-
isfactorily performed. Consequently, the supreme court up-
held the trial judge's admission of Orebia's hypnotically
11. Id. at 563, 329 N.W.2d at 390-91.
12. Apparently, the state felt this issue warranted immediate review by the
supreme court and petitioned to bypass the intermediary court of appeals pursuant to
Wis. STAT. §§ 809.60 & 808.05 (1979-80).
13. The defendant also raised three other issues on appeal. The court found the
line-up procedure sufficiently reliable to permit an out-of-court identification to be
admitted into evidence. Although the line-up was conducted in close proximity to
Kamps' apartment building and the men participating in the line-up were of equal
height and were shown sequentially rather than as a group, the court held these fac-
tors did not make the identification impermissibly suggestive. Nor did the extensive
security precautions improperly induce Orebia to identify the defendant so as to cast
doubt on the reliability of the identification. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 577, 329
N.W.2d at 397. The court also affirmed the trial judge's admission of two color photo-
graphs of the victim lying on her face with blood smeared over her nude body. The
court agreed the pictures would aid the jury in their dispassionate determination of
the facts. Id. at 579, 329 N.W.2d at 398. Finally, the court summarily held the state
did not breach its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. This duty only arises when
evidence is within the exclusive control of the state. See State v. Amundson, 69 Wis.
2d 554, 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975). Armstrong argued that a parking ticket may have
proved his innocence. The court, however, held that since the defendant paid the
ticket and received the cancelled check, the ticket was never in the exclusive control of
the state. Therefore, the duty of disclosing exculpatory evidence never arose. Arm-
strong, 110 Wis. 2d at 580, 329 N.W.2d at 398.
14. 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983).
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aided testimony and identification and affirmed the
conviction.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Scientific Background
Although the phenomenon of hypnosis has its origin dat-
ing back thousands of years,' 5 hypnosis has only recently en-
joyed serious scientific interest and recognition.' 6 Because
no theory of the nature of hypnosis has gained universal ac-
ceptance, 17 it is difficult to accurately define the phenome-
non. One representative definition of hypnosis is the
following:
[Hypnosis is a] temporary condition of altered attention in
the subject which may be induced by another person and
in which a variety of phenomena may appear spontane-
ously or in response to verbal or other stimuli. The phe-
nomena include alterations in consciousness and memory,
increased susceptibility to suggestion and the production in
the subject of responses and ideas unfamiliar to him in his
usual state of mind.' 8
Scientists agree that hypnosis has significant value and
application in medicine, dentistry and psychiatry. 9 The le-
15. The origin of hypnosis may date back to antiquity, with Egyptian priests,
Greek oracles, and Hindu fakirs using hypnosis in some form. For speculation con-
cerning the origin of hypnosis, see H. CRASILNECK & J. HALL, CLINICAL HYPNOSIS:
PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 5-6 (1975); W. KROGER, supra note 1, at 1; W. KRO-
GER & W. FEZLER, supra note I, at 6-8; MacHovec, Hypnosis Be/ore Mesmer, 17 AM.
J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 215-19 (1975).
16. The interest in and use of hypnosis increased greatly during World War II,
when hypnosis was successfully used to treat psychogenic war problems (battle fa-
tigue, battle neuroses). See H. CRASILNECK & J. HALL, supra note 15, at 9-10; E.
HILGARD, supra note 1, at 4; W. KROGER, supra note 1, at 4.
17. For excellent summaries of the various theories of hypnosis, see H.
CRASILNECK & J. HALL, supra note 15, at 13-3 1; W. KROGER, supra note 1, at 26-32;
M. TEITELBAUM, HYPNOSIS INDUCTION TECHNICS 8-15 (1980); Chertok, Eary Theo-
ries of Hpnosis, in HANDBOOK OF HYPNOSIS AND PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE I-11
(G. Burrows & L. Dennerstein eds. 1980); Meares, Theories ofHypnosis, in HYPNOSIS
IN MODERN MEDICINE 390-404 (J. Schneck 3d ed. 1963).
18. COUNCIL ON MENTAL HEALTH, Medical Use ofHypnosis, 168 J. A.M.A. 186,
187 (1958). The Council adopted the British Medical Association's definition of
hypnosis.
19. The medical profession uses hypnosis to control and relieve pain caused by
cancer, bums, headaches and childbirth, as a method of anesthesia, and in the treat-
ment of dermatological, gynecological, respiratory and neuromuscular disorders. The
dental practitioner skilled in the use of hypnosis finds it effective in calming patients
[Vol. 67:349
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gal profession has been increasingly attracted to hypnosis
due to its ability to discover the truth by enhancing recall.20
However, courts have approached hypnosis cautiously, fear-
ing the dangers inherent in its use.
The most serious concerns regarding hypnosis center
upon its effect on the subject. Scientific evidence indicates it
is possible for a subject to fill in gaps in memory with imagi-
nary or inaccurate bits of information.2' This is known as
confabulation. The danger of confabulation is that the sub-
ject may recall inaccurate images while under hypnosis and
then confidently testify at trial to the validity of his memory
of the event.22 Another danger inherent in the use of hypno-
and relieving excessive pain. Perhaps hypnosis is most often applied and appreciated
in the psychiatric profession, where hypnosis is used in treating the following: psy-
chosomatic illnesses; obesity and diet; control of smoking and nail biting; sexual dys-
function; group hypnotherapy; psychotherapy; and phobia disorders. See generally
H. CRASILNECK & J. HALL, supra note 15; HANDBOOK OF HYPNOSIS AND PSYCHOSO-
MATIC MEDICINE, supra note 17; W. KROGER, supra note I.
20. See supra note 1.
21. See W. KROGER,Supra note 1, at 16; W. KROGER & W. FEZLER,supra note I,
at 21; Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective
Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 335 (1980); Loftus & Loftus, On the Permanence of
Stored Information in the Human Brain, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 409, 415 (1980); Orne,
supra note 1, at 318-19; Spector & FosterAdmissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the
Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 594 (1977). See generally C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 208, at 507-10 (2d ed. 1972).
22. Diamond, supra note 21, at 339-40; Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnoticall;
Influenced Testimony, 4 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 1, 9 (1977); Orne, supra note 1, at 327-28.
Orne states that hypnosis "serves to help convince the subject about the veridicality of
these memories.memories that might previously have been extremely tentative and
about which the individual had little or no subjective conviction." Orne, supra note 1,
at 327. An example of this phenomenon is an attempt by a subject to recall the sec-
ond verse of Longfellow's poem, "The Village Blacksmith." The correct wording of
the poem is the following:
His hair is crisp, and black, and long,
His face is like the tan;
His brow is wet with honest sweat,
He earns whate'er he can,
And looks the whole world in the face,
For he owes not any man.
The subject felt the following response was an accurate recollection of the poem:
"The smithy whistles at his forge
As he shapes the iron band;
The smith is very happy
As he owes not any man."
E. HILGARD, supra note I, at 166.
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sis is the subject's heightened susceptibility to suggestion.23
Suggestion may promote confabulation.24 In addition, there
is a direct relationship between the depth of hypnosis and
the degree of suggestibility.25 As a subject falls deeper into a
hypnotic state, it is more likely the subject will respond to
suggestion. Finally, studies indicate that a subject may actu-
ally deceive an experienced hypnotist by faking a hypnotic
state26 or by wilfully lying27 during a hypnotic session.
The dangers inherent in hypnosis can also stem from the
hypnotist. In addition to the unintentional slip of a prejudi-
cial suggestion, 28 a hypnotist can deliberately distort the
mind of a deeply hypnotized subject to the point of brain-
washing.29 This danger, combined with the possibility of the
continuing influence of the hypnotic suggestion,30 can sub-
stantially affect the reliability of posthypnotic testimony.
Hypnosis may also affect the subjective consideration of
a jury. Hypnosis may resolve any doubts and uncertainties
the witness had experienced recollecting prior events.3 ' This
effect can significantly increase the confidence of the witness
23. Diamond, supra note 21, at 333 (person in hypnotic state cannot escape
heightened suggestibility, because by its nature, hypnosis is a condition of increased
susceptibility to suggestion). See generally Dilloff, supra note 22, at 5; Orne, On the
Simulating Subject as a Quasi-Control Group in Hypnosis Research: What, Why and
How, in HYPNOSIS: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 519, 520-
21 (E. Fromm & R. Shor 2d ed. 1979); Spector & Foster, supra note 21, at 574-78.
24. It is common for a subject to want to please the hypnotist. To satisfy that
desire, the subject may confabulate in order to respond favorably to the suggestion of
the hypnotist. Diamond, supra note 21, at 335; Loftus & Loftus, supra note 21, at 414-
15.
25. Dilloff, supra note 22, at 5; Spector & Foster, supra note 21, at 574-75. Sug-
gestibility refers to the degree of response to a suggestion whereas depth refers to the
degree of the subject's hypnotic condition.
26. Diamond, supra note 21, at 336-37; Dilloff, supra note 22, at 6; Orne, supra
note 1, at 313.
27. Orne, supra note I, at 313; Spector & Foster, supra note 21, at 594.
28. See Diamond, supra note 21, at 333 (hypnotic suggestions need not be verbal,
for attitudes, demeanor and even body language may communicate suggestions to the
subject).
29. "An unscrupulous hypnotist with a malleable subject can totally distort the
purpose of hypnosis and its purported use in the legal sphere." Dilloff, supra note 22,
at 6.
30. Scientific evidence indicates the effect of suggestions endure indefinitely. The
duration of the effect may correspond to the type of suggestion; a theatrical type of
posthypnotic suggestion may last only a few hours, but a less obvious suggestion may
never cease. Diamond, supra note 21, at 335-36; Dilloff, supra note 22, at 7.
31. See supra note 22.
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on the stand. Because the jury relies on the courtroom de-
meanor of a witness in its determination of the weight to
accord the testimony, this artificially induced confidence
may affect the accuracy of that determination. Moreover,
the erroneous belief that hypnosis reveals only the truth32
may improperly influence the jury's assessment of the credi-
bility of the witness.
B. Prior Case Law
American courts were originally opposed to the admis-
sion of testimony aided by hypnosis. In 1897, the California
Supreme Court stated: "[T]he law of the United States does
not recognize hypnotism. ' 33 This judicial reluctance to ac-
cept hypnosis continued well into the twentieth century with
most courts excluding all testimony derived from hypnosis
or given subsequent to it.3 4 Finally, in 1968 a Maryland
court reversed this trend in its endorsement of the admission
of posthypnotic testimony in a state criminal proceeding.35
Since 1968, many jurisdictions have considered the ad-
mission of posthypnotic testimony.3 6 Three approaches to
the admission of hynotically affected testimony have
developed.
Some courts exclude posthypnotic testimony, basing
their exclusion on the evidentiary test established by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals in Frye v. United
States.37 In Frye, a defendant convicted of second degree
murder appealed the decision of the trial court to exclude
expert testimony concerning the results of a systolic blood
pressure deception test performed on him. Affirming the ex-
clusion of the testimony, the court reasoned that before ex-
pert testimony may be admitted the procedure from which
32. See Orne, supra note 1, at 313; Spector & Foster, supra note 21, at 594-95.
See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at 507-10.
33. People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, _, 49 P. 1049, 1053 (1897).
34. See supra note 2.
35. Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cer. denied, 395 U.S.
949 (1969). Maryland has since reconsidered its position on the admissibility of post-
hypnotic testimony and has held such testimony inadmissible. See Collins v. State, 52
Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982), at'd, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
36. At least 26 states and the federal courts have addressed this exact issue, with
11 states excluding posthypnotic testimony and 15 admitting it.
37. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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the expert opinion was made must first gain general accept-
ance in the scientific community.38 Applying this theory, the
Fyre court held that the systolic blood pressure deception
test had not received the scientific recognition necessary to
justify expert testimony concerning the results of the test.39
Courts which base their exclusion of posthypnotic testi-
mony on Frye interpret the Frye decision to require that
before such testimony is admitted into evidence, the appro-
priate scientific discipline must first recognize hypnosis as a
valid technique for extracting accurate memories from
which reliable testimony can be derived. Because of the
dangers of hypnosis, 40 some experts have refused to endorse
the reliability of hypnotically affected testimony.4 This re-
jection has provided the basis for courts to state that hypno-
sis has not yet received the scientific recognition required by
Frye to allow the admission of posthypnotic testimony.42
In the jurisdictions which admit hypnotically affected
testimony, there are two approaches to its admission. Some
courts indicate the issue of hypnosis is properly considered
by attacking the credibility of the testimony, not its admissi-
bility.43 In these jurisdictions the trier of fact must deter-
38. Id. at 1014.
39. Id.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 21-32.
41. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 21, at 349; Spector & Foster, supra note 21, at
583.
42. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, _, 644 P.2d
1266, 1285-87 (1982) (supplemental opinion following rehearing); People v. Shirley,
31 Cal. 3d 18, _, 641 P.2d 775, 794-804, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 263-72 (1982); People v.
Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710, 711-12 (Colo. App. 1982); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, .. ,
464 A.2d 1028, 1034 (1983); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, _ 447 N.E.2d
1190, 1196-97 (1983); People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, _ 329 N.W.2d 743, 745-48
(1982); State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. 1982); People v. Hughes, 59
N.Y.2d 523, - 453 N.E.2d 484, 494, - N.Y.S.2d - - (1983); Commonwealth v.
Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, _ 436 A.2d 170, 172-78 (1981). Some courts have merely
relied on a review of or comparison to other jurisidictions and have embraced Frye
without explicitly adopting it. See, e.g., Peterson v. State, - Ind. _, 448 N.E.2d 673
(1983); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981). Many of these jurisdic-
tions have since modified their per se exclusion of all testimony from a previously
hypnotized witness to admit prehypnotic testimony provided it is reliably preserved.
See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 213 Neb. 686, 331 N.W.2d 500 (1983); Commonwealth v.
Taylor, 294 Pa. Super. 171, 439 A.2d 805 (1982).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 885 (1979); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, _ 205 S.E.2d 240, 241-42 (1974);
State v. Seager, No. 237-68535 (Iowa Nov. 23, 1983) (available Jan. 21, 1984, on
[Vol. 67:349
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mine the proper weight to accord the hypnotically affected
testimony. Other states admit the posthypnotic testimony
provided the proponent can first satisfy the burden of dem-
onstrating that the use of hypnosis is a reasonably reliable
means of restoring memory.44 These jurisdictions either de-
mand compliance with specific procedures in conducting a
hypnotic session45 or suggest guidelines for the trial court to
follow in its review of the hypnotic examination.46
III. THE ARMSTRONG ANALYSIS OF
POSTHYPNOTIC TESTIMONY
In State v. Armstrong,47 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
initially reviewed the dangers and benefits of hypnosis to the
legal profession. The court noted hypnosis creates the possi-
bility of producing inaccurate recollections and increases the
suggestibility of the subject. However, the court also empha-
sized the ability of hypnosis to uncover information locked
in the memory of a witness.48
After a discussion of decisions from other jurisdictions,
the court addressed the applicability of Frye v. United
States49 to the admission of posthypnotic testimony. The
court narrowly construed the holding of Frye by stating:
"The Frye test requires that before expert opinion can be
admitted, the appropriate scientific discipline must generally
LEXIS, States library, Iowa file); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. 1983); State
v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, __ 244 S.E.2d 414, 427-29 (1978); State v. Brown, 337
N.W.2d 138, 151 (N.D. 1983); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, __., 492 P.2d 312, 315
(1971).
44. See, e.g., Key v. State, 430 So. 2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); People v.
Smrekar, 68 M11. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); State v.
Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1981); State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 845 (1982); Chapman
v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982).
45. See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, _ 432 A.2d 86, 96-97 (1981); State v.
Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, _, 643 P.2d 246, 252-54 (1981); State v. Long, 32 Wash. App.
732, - 649 P.2d 845, 846-47 (1982).
46. See, e.g., Key v. State, 430 So. 2d 909, 911-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, ._, 385 N.E.2d 848, 855 (1979); State v. Greer,
609 S.W.2d 423, 435-36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897, 904
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1284-85 n.6 (Wyo. 1982).
47. 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983).
48. Id. at 565-66, 329 N.W.2d at 392.
49. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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accept as valid and reliable the scientific technique from
which the evidence underlying the testimony is derived."' 5 °
The court determined the Frye test was inapplicable to the
question presented in Armstrong because the reliability of
Orebia's posthypnotic testimony was at issue, not the admis-
sion of expert scientific opinion.'
The Armstrong court could have ended its discussion of
Frye at this point, but instead it interpreted Frye to require
that scientific authorities recognize the reliability of hypnosis
to extract accurate information from a witness before post-
hypnotic testimony will be admitted in court.5 2  However,
the Armstrong court rejected this application of Frye by rely-
ing on the fact that no expert can testify to the exact effect of
hypnosis on human memory nor can an expert testify that
normal conscious memory is an accurate representation of
an event.53 Without such expert testimony, the court con-
50. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 567, 329 N.W.2d at 392.
51. Id. at 567-68, 329 N.W.2d at 393. Other jurisdictions have rejected Frye for
various reasons. See, e.g., Key v. State, 430 So. 2d 909, 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(admission of hypnotically affected testimony lies simply in the discretion of the trial
court); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. 1983) (cases applying Frye are factually
distinguished); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, _ 432 A.2d 86, 91-92 (1981) (Frye test
satisfied because hypnosis has received the necessary scientific recognition); State v.
Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, _, 643 P.2d 246, 252 (1981) (hypnosis as a memory aid has
gained scientific recognition).
52. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 568, 329 N.W.2d at 393. It appears the court
wanted to reject Frye by using the other courts' interpretations of it. See supra notes
37-42 and accompanying text.
53. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 568, 329 N.W.2d at 393. The reliability of eyewit-
ness identification and testimony has been increasingly questioned, undoubtedly be-
cause of the formidable number of eyewitness misidentifications. The United States
Supreme Court has stated: "The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-
known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification."
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
To compensate for deficiencies in memory, corroboration of evidence or expert
testimony concerning the unreliability of eyewitness identification may be required.
Some courts have set forth an instruction to inform the jury of the problems with
eyewitness identification. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir.
1972). Teifaire was adopted in United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir.
1975) and United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 275 (4th Cir. 1974). However, not all
jurisdictions follow Teifaire and even if the courts employ the remedial procedures
mentioned above, "[a]ll the evidence points rather strikingly to the conclusion that
there is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand,
points a finger at the defendant, and says 'that's the one!'" Watkins v. Sowders, 449
U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Marshall, J., joining Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (quoting E. Lozrrus, EYEwITNEss TESTIMONY 19 (1979)).
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cluded this interpretation of Frye could not control the ad-
mission of hypnotically affected testimony.5 4
In Armstrong, the court responded to the defendant's ar-
gument that the admission of Orebia's testimony was a de-
nial of Armstrong's constitutionally protected right to
confront and cross-examine a witness.55 The defendant ar-
gued that hypnosis strengthened the confidence Orebia had
in the validity of her testimony and identification of the de-
fendant,56 thus affecting the jury's ability to "determine cred-
ibility by viewing the witness' conduct, appearance and
demeanor, and clarity of recollection. 57
The Armstrong court acknowledged that some experts
agree hypnosis may increase the confidence of a witness, but
noted that although other forms of refreshed recollection58
may produce similar effects on confidence, 59 none have been
held a denial of the right of confrontation.60  The court
stated three factors had preserved the defendant's right of
confrontation: defense counsel cross-examined Orebia; de-
fense counsel informed the jury of Orebia's hypnotic exami-
nation; and defense counsel introduced expert testimony to
reveal the confidence-strengthening effect of hypnosis.61 The
54. The Armstrong court noted that even if the Frye test governed the disposition
of this issue, its requirements would be satisfied by the recognition and acceptance of
hypnosis by the appropriate scientific discipline. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 567 n.14,
329 N.W.2d at 393 n. 14. For case law and scientific authority recognizing the reliabil-
ity of hypnosis to refresh memory, see State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, _ 432 A.2d 86, 91-
92 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, _, 643 P.2d 246, 252 (1981); Reiser, Hp-
nosis as an Aid in a Homocide Investigation, 17 AM. J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 84-87
(1974).
55. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 568, 329 N.W.2d at 393. Other states have ac-
cepted this argument and denied admission of hypnotically affected testimony. See,
e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 276, _, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1981) (en banc); State v.
Peterson, - Ind.._ _ 448 N.E.2d 673, 678-79 (1983).
56. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
57. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 569, 329 N.W.2d at 393.
58. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 906.12 (1981-82). This statute provides in part:
906.12 Writing used to refresh memory. If a witness uses a writing to refresh
his memory for the purpose of testifying, either before or while testifying, an
adverse party is entitled to have it produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to
cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions
which relate to the testimony of the witness.
59. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 569, 329 N.W.2d at 393.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 570, 329 N.W.2d at 394. To preserve the right of confrontation, the
federal courts have ruled that if the proponent of the testimony fails to notify the
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court stated these factors provided a basis for jury evaluation
of the credibility of Orebia's testimony, thus satisfying the
defendant's right of confrontation.
IV. PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED
Because the court was acutely aware of the dangers in-
volved in posthypnotic testimony, it set forth procedures to
be followed during a hypnotic session and during trials when
hypnotically affected testimony is proffered. The court also
suggested guidelines the trial court should consider in a pre-
trial review of the hypnotic session. In order to use post-
hypnotic testimony, the proponent of the testimony must
reveal its intended use to his adversary before trial. Oppos-
ing counsel may then move for a suppression hearing. At
the pretrial hearing, the proponent of the testimony must
demonstrate to the court 62 that no undue suggestions were
made to the witness during the hypnotic session to make the
subsequent testimony unreliable.63
The trial judge in his pretrial review of the hypnotic ses-
sion should consider the following guidelines. The person
administering hypnosis should have special training in the
use of hypnosis. It is preferable that the expert is a psychia-
trist or psychologist. The hypnotist should be an indepen-
dent professional and should have limited knowledge of the
case. No person representing any party should be in the ex-
amining room while the witness is hypnotized. Finally, the
hypnotist should strive to avoid prejudicial suggestions con-
cerning critical facts of the case.64 It is important to note
that these guidelines are not absolute, since compliance with
opposing party of the use of hypnotically affected testimony, a new trial may be
granted. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 830-33 (2d Cir. 1969); Em-
mett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp. 1025, 1037-42 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
62. Two courts have determined the use of hypnotically affected testimony re-
quires additional safeguards for its admission. Therefore, the proponent of the testi-
mony must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony is reliable.
According to these courts, this standard is appropriate to deter the potential abuse of
hypnosis, to avoid injustice and to ensure reliability. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, _
432 A.2d 86, 97 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, _ 643 P.2d 246, 254 (1981).
63. State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 571-73, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394-95 (1983).
64. State v. White, No. J-3665 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 1979), quoted
in State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 571 n.23, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394 n.23 (1983).
The exact guidelines are:
[Vol. 67:349
HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED TESTIMONY
them does not assure the admission of the testimony nor
does the failure to follow the guidelines automatically ex-
clude the testimony.65
If, at the pretrial hearing, the trial judge determines the
hypnotically affected testimony to be admissible, the propo-
nent of the testimony may not introduce the fact of hypnosis
in his case-in-chief because of the possibility the jury will
erroneously believe that hypnosis reveals only the truth.66
Only opposing counsel may raise the issue of hypnosis and
challenge the testimony by calling experts to testify to the
possible adverse effects of hypnosis on memory.67 However,
the proponent will then be permitted to introduce his experts
I. The person administering the hypnotic session ought to be a mental
health person with special training in the use of hypnosis, preferably a psychia-
trist or a psychologist.
2. This specially trained person should not be informed about the case
verbally. Rather, such person should receive a written memorandum outlining
whatever facts are necessary to know. Care should be exercised to avoid any
communication that might influence the person's opinion.
3. Said specially trained person should be an independent professional
not responsible to the prosecution, investigators or the defense.
4. All contact between the specially trained person and the subject should
be videotaped from beginning to end.
5. Nobody representing the police or the prosecutor or the defendant
should be in the same room with the specially trained person while he is work-
ing with the subject.
6. Prior to induction, a mental health professional should examine the
subject to exclude the possibility that the subject is physically or mentally ill
and to confirm that the subject possesses sufficient judgment, intelligence, and
reason to comprehend what is happening.
7. The specially trained person should elicit a detailed description of the
facts as the subject believes them to be prior to the use of hypnosis.
8. The specially trained person should strive to avoid adding any new
elements to the subject's description of her/his experience, including any im-
plicit or explicit cues during the pre-session contact, the actual hypnosis and
the post-session contact.
9. Consideration should be given to any other evidence tending to corrob-
orate or challenge the information garnered during the trance or as a result of
posthypnotic suggestion.
Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 571 n.23, 329 N.W.2d at 394 n.23.
65. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 571-72 n.23, 329 N.W.2d at 394-95 n.23.
66. Id. at 573, 329 N.W.2d at 395. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67. This procedure satisfies three goals. It permits the defendant to properly at-
tack the credibility of the witness, it protects the jury from initially giving undue
weight to the testimony as a result of its knowledge of hypnosis and it satisfies the
defendant's right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d
at 573, 329 N.W.2d at 395.
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to counter any opposing expert testimony.68
The Armstrong court also noted its concern regarding the
danger of confabulation. The court recognized confabula-
tion could not be controlled through procedural protections
because it occurs during hypnotic recall and also during con-
scious recollection.69 Consequently, the court's decision re-
quires the trial judge to consider the possibility of
confabulation in determining whether to admit the testi-
mony. To do this, the trial judge must take into account
both the totality of the circumstances and the procedures
used in the hypnotic examination to determine whether the
hypnotically influenced testimony is reliable.
V. REFLECTIONS
Relying on its rejection of Frye and a comparison of de-
cisions in other jurisdictions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Armstrong refused to adopt a per se exclusion of post-
hypnotic testimony. The critical question is whether the
Armstrong decision will provide a basis for the admission of
reliable posthypnotic testimony.
Of the two alternatives available to the court in the ad-
mission of posthypnotic testimony,70 a conservative case-by-
case approach is clearly the more desirable. A per se rule of
admission leaves the consideration of the reliability of hyp-
notically affected testimony to the trier of fact without any
prior judicial intervention.71 While this approach may pro-
mote judicial economy,72 it may also admit testimony seri-
ously affected by prejudicial suggestions or containing
impermissible amounts of confabulation. In addition, this
per se approach gives the proponent of the evidence an ad-
vantage because the testimony is virtually assured
admittance.7 3
68. Id. at 573, 329 N.W.2d at 395.
69. Id. at 568, 329 N.W.2d at 393.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
71. See supra text accompanying note 43.
72. See Commonwealth v. Kater, 338 Mass. 519, - 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1196
(1983) (allowing experts to testify on the effects of the hypnotic session in each case is
time-consuming and expensive).
73. The only recourse available to the opponent of the posthypnotic testimony is
to challenge the basis for its admission to a higher court. However, the likelihood of a
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In its choice of a case-by-case approach, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court avoided the dangers associated with per se
admissibility and adopted the alternative which takes into
account the scientific uncertainties of hypnotically affected
testimony. Although a case-by-case approach is more
favorable to the opponent of the testimony,74 it is more con-
sistent with the court's recognition of the dangers involved in
hypnosis. The pretrial hearing may be costly and time con-
suming, but the questionable reliability of this testimony de-
mands judicial review of the hypnotic session. In light of
these considerations, the court has correctly chosen the more
cautious approach to the admission of posthypnotic
testimony.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court promoted flex-
ibility in the review of the hypnotic session by making the
guidelines permissive rather than mandatory,75 there is likely
to be close adherence to the guidelines because hypnotically
affected testimony is a novel and complex issue. Trial judges
may also find safety in following authorized guidelines and
although compliance with the guidelines by the proponent
will not guarantee admission of the posthypnotic testi-
mony,76 the likelihood of its admission will be much greater.
VI. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
One critical question left unanswered in Armstrong is the
amount of additional facts recalled through hypnosis which
will be admitted into evidence before the testimony becomes
unreliable as a product of confabulation.77 The Armstrong
reversal by the higher court is limited and the expense of the appeal to the opponent
may be prohibitive. Yet, a Maryland court recently reconsidered its position on this
issue and reversed its former practice of directing the fact of hypnosis to an attack on
the credibility of the witness in lieu of a per se exclusion rule. See supra note 35.
74. This procedure is advantageous to the opponent because an attack on the
admission of hypnotically aided testimony may be made before trial, thus requiring
the proponent to meet the appropriate burden of proof - a burden he may not
satisfy.
75. Flexibility is a good policy because the court can consider a factor not specifi-
cally authorized, yet nevertheless important to the determination of the admission of
posthypnotic testimony. See Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Wyo. 1982).
76. See supra text accompanying note 65.
77. However, the court has indicated that some unnecessary suggestions will not
defeat the reliability or admissibility of hypnotically affected testimony. The court
reviewed the hypnotic examination and found that although some suggestions were
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court did not address this issue because the hypnotized wit-
ness, Orebia, was unable to give a posthypnotic facial
description of the defendant. Such a detailed description
might raise an inference of confabulation. Moreover,
Orebia's general description of the defendant was not signifi-
cantly altered by hypnosis.78 The court noted the detailed
posthypnotic testimony of a witness suffering from posttrau-
matic amnesia would be excluded as unreliable because of
the probability of confabulation.79 However, limiting the
admission of hypnotically affected testimony to cases in
which the posthypnotic testimony is "substantially the
same" 80 as the prehypnotic description casts considerable
doubt on the utility of hypnosis to aid a witness in the recol-
lection of prior events. Hypnosis is a procedure to refresh
memory; a refreshed memory recalls additional facts. In es-
tablishing a standard to follow, the court in the future will
have to balance the benefit of the additional facts against the
possibility of confabulation within them.
Future cases may also address the admission of unreli-
able posthypnotic testimony. Does admission of such unreli-
able testimony demand automatic reversal or warrant a
case-by-case determination of whether it is prejudicial or
harmless error?8' Other issues for future consideration in-
clude: the effect of the failure to notify opposing counsel of
the intended use of hypnosis;8 2 the exact evidentiary burden
the proponent of the testimony bears in the pretrial suppres-
sion hearing;83 and the effect of the opponent's failure to
made to Orebia concerning the defendant's height, these suggestions were harmless
considering that, at the posthypnotic line-up, the height of the defendant was not
readily apparent. State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 574, 329 N.W.2d 386, 396
(1983). At the line-up, the defendant refused to cross the street near the victim's
apartment building, thus forcing police officers to drag him. To assure the reliability
of the line-up, the police also dragged other participants to produce the similar limp
effect. Id. at 563, 329 N.W.2d at 391.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
79. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 575, 329 N.W.2d at 396.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243
(1981) (admission of unreliable posthypnotic testimony is not per se reversible error,
but requires a case-by-case determination of whether the admission is prejudicial or
harmless); State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. 1982).
82. Seesupra note 61.
83. See supra note 62.
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move for a pretrial suppression hearing. Perhaps of greatest
interest will be the applicability of hypnosis to civil cases8 4
and, if applicable, whether the procedures will vary or re-
main the same.
Any answers to these questions are purely speculative.
Because Armstrong was a case of first impression, the court
could not address every issue involved in admission of post-
hypnotic testimony. The Armstrong court approved the use
of hypnosis to refresh the memory of a witness and took pre-
cautionary steps to help promote the reliability of hypnoti-
cally aided testimony. Additional questions regarding the
use of hypnotically affected testimony will be answered in
time. However, the importance of the Armstrong decision is
that Wisconsin has received a practical foundation for the
use of posthypnotic testimony from its highest court.
GREGORY F. ROTHSTEIN
84. For civil cases permitting the use of hypnosis, see Kline v. Ford Motor Co.,
523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir.
1974).
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